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FILE No. **NB** R 3/548/1 (Part)

TITLE: POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN
UNITED KINGDOM AND IRAQ.

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Mr. D. Smith			Registry		7.12			
BS	PA		Mr. Russell					
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FILE No. **NB** R 3/548/1

PART

Co (1972) minutes of statMr. Parsons.Mr ~~Parsons~~Mr Remington.c.c. PUSD
M & V D. (Mr Mallett)

I agree that these steps should be taken - and taken at once. We should also consider offering the "small fry" as well (Parat). What are the "legal difficulties" in this?

J.G.
29/3/72

IRAQ

Problem

Flag A 1. The involvement of the Iraq Public Relations Bureau in the attack in February in London on General Abdul Razzaq al Naif has now been established (NERO 140). It is clear from this report that the PRB may try again to assassinate Naif. How should we now proceed to demonstrate to the Iraqis that we will not tolerate a recurrence?

Background

Flag B 2. We have evidence that the PRB have been trying for some months to assassinate Naif, a former Prime Minister who has been condemned to death by the Ba'athi regime and has long been at the head of the assassination list of the PRB. The last attempt against him took place in mid-February and is described in Mr Egerton's minute of 21 February.

Argument

3. It is essential to try and prevent any further attempts in London against Naif's life. We have an obligation to protect Naif himself; and we certainly do not want to run the risk of any British by-stander being injured or killed in this kind of incident. The arguments for indicating our disapproval to the Iraqis are therefore strong.

4. The leading PRB member in London, Adnan Ibrahim Hussain (paragraph 9 of NERO 140) has left the United Kingdom and those members of the PRB who remain in London are small fry. It would seem pointless to expel these people as a gesture, since this would not particularly impress the Iraqi authorities, nor deter them from trying to send other more important members of the PRB to London. In any case there might well be legal difficulties about expelling members of the PRB.

5. A better course would be to make as difficult as possible the future entry into this country of members of the PRB not already resident here. This can probably be done by the introduction of new visa procedures which should apply to nearly all applicants, the only exceptions being Iraqi ministers.

Flag C These procedures are outlined in Mr Mallett's letter to

Flag D Mr Rae of 16 March, and in Mr Mallett's draft telegram to Baghdad. They should enable us to identify members of the PRB, who should then be refused visas. The question arises of whether leading Ba'athists should also be excluded. At present it would probably be wiser to keep this tactic in reserve.

6. We must of course bear in mind that such measures may result in retaliatory action against our Interests Section in Baghdad. Iraqi harassment of our people there is already

Flag E starting in a mild way (see Mr Lewty's letters of 9 March

Flag F and 17 March). It remains to be seen whether the action

/proposed

proposed in the preceding paragraph will make the Iraqis markedly tougher towards the Interests Section. If it does we could in the last resort withdraw some or all of our personnel; if we did this, the Commercial Section should be the last to leave.

Recommendation

7. I therefore recommend:

- (a) Mr Mallett's draft telegram should issue;
- (b) members of the Iraq PRB should not be granted UK visas until further notice;
- (c) the question of excluding leading Ba'athists (possibly including Ministers) from this country should be reviewed in about two months;
- (d) Mr Lewty should be told that we realise the procedures outlined in Mr Mallett's draft telegram may cause difficulties for our Interests Section in Baghdad. He should of course report any such harassment immediately to enable us to consider what action we should take. (We should also tell him fairly soon in reply to his letters of 9th 17 March that visas for both Interests Sections should be on a reciprocal basis. A minute on this question will be submitted separately.)

8. PUSD and Migration and Visa Department agree.

V Beckett

V Beckett
Near Eastern Department

29 March 1972

/The Minister...

SECRET COVERING TOP SECRET

Mr Renwick

The Minister of State need not read the back papers but he should be aware of this case which may involve some kind of Iraqi retaliation against our Interests Section in Baghdad.

2. Briefly the situation is that we are proposing in future to refuse visas to known members of the Iraqi Public Relations Bureau. This organisation is known to be the Iraqi Government's murder squad which specialises in assassination of the opponents of the régime. It was undoubtedly the PRB which was responsible for the recent attempt in London and they may try again.

3. I agree therefore with the recommendations in paragraph 7 of Miss Beckett's submission.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'A D Parsons'. The signature is stylized with a large, looped initial 'A' and a cursive 'D'.

A D Parsons

29 March 1972

SECRET COVERING TOP SECRET

W ①

Covering SECRET.

Don S/4

M. Matet (M+V Dept)

M. Hancock (PUS Dept)

Sent and agreed by
M. Hakey.

S/4

IRAQ

Please see attached draft minute. I should be grateful for any comments you may have, as soon as possible.

S/4 (ME Dept)
4/4.

I have made some amendments but if the

submission in its present form is not accepted before any action was contemplated against individuals and before tactics were discussed

I would wish to check the precise status of the small fry. If one had collected a British wife, for example, the full implications would have to be considered.

James
M.V.D. S/4

Noted.

Minute
submittedper S/4
6/4.

ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY⁽²⁾
British Interests
Section



BAGHDAD

UNCLASSIFIED

1 April 1972

B Smith, Esq
Middle East Department
F C O

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 - 4 APR 1972
NBR 3/548/1.

Dear Brian

LONDON VISIT

1. Many thanks for your letter NEQ 3/548/1⁽²⁹⁾ of 28 March and for taking so much trouble.
2. The programme looks fine, but I think I might need a little more than an hour with Christopher Long and since there is quite a lot I would like to discuss with Waller, it may not be practicable to start seeing them as late as 4 p.m.

Enter
pub
6/4

Yours ever
lan

D I Lewty

RR BAGHDAD

RR BEIRUT

GR 35

EN CLAIR

FM FCO 131410Z

NO L BUTION

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TO ROUTINE BAGHDAD TELNO 126 OF 13 APRIL AND TO BEIRUT.

LEWTY'S LETTER OF 24 MARCH TO MISS BECKETT.

LEWTY WILL NOT (NOT) BE CARRYING A BAG ON 15 MARCH SO WILL NOT NEED ESCORT DURING STOPOVER IN BEIRUT OR ON ARRIVAL IN BAGHDAD.

DOUGLAS-HOME

NNNN

From: Martin McLaren, M.P.



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

13th June 1972

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REGISTRY No. 35

15 JU 1972

NBR 3/548/1

Dear John

Douglas Dodds-Parker mentioned the following point which he asked me to pass on to the Office.

During his recent WEU talks in Paris, he learnt that the Iraqi Ambassador in Paris is a very good friend of ours, and the suggestion is that if we wanted to improve our relations with Iraq he would be a suitable go-between, and that it might be helpful if our Minister in Paris were to keep in touch with him.

Yours truly,

Martin

J.A.N. Graham Esq., *CMG.*
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,
Downing Street, Whitehall,
London, S.W. 1.

Med ⑤

Mr. Allen to see!

No action 9th June?
14 June, 1972

Mr. Gutter

9th June to
Chamney Paris
& PUS? Nall

15/6

- 15/6

Yes, please.
(letter +
my)
15/6.

④

Many thanks for your letter of
the 13th about the Iraqi Ambassador
in Paris. I will see that this gets
to the right people.

Copied
15/6
fa

(J. A. H. Graham)

Mr. McLaren, Esq., M.P.,
House of Commons,
201

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
Mr Burton *5/7 pa*

VISIT OF IRAQI BA'ATH PARTY DELEGATION

1. It may be worth recording that Mr Michael Adams of the Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding telephoned Mr Gore-Booth of NENAD (in the mistaken belief that that Department deals with Iraq) to say that Mr Will Griffiths MP was holding a tea party at the House of Commons on 6 July for the Iraqi delegation, comprising representatives of the Ba'ath and other parties, and to ask whether a member of the FCO would accept an invitation to be present.

2. A description of this delegation was given in Baghdad Visa telegram No. 107 of 17 June in which the purpose of their journey was described by the Baghdad press as being to discuss "ways and means of strengthening the anti-imperialist-colonialist front". Mr Parsons (whom I consulted) tells me that the Morning Star has reported that ~~the~~ delegation was visiting the UK on the invitation of the British Communist Party.

3. After consultation with Protocol and Conference Department and the Parliamentary Unit, I telephoned Mr Adams this morning and told him that we would not wish to be represented at the party and explained that this was in accordance with our normal practice in the case of countries with whom we had no diplomatic relations. Mr Adams said that he understood this but had thought that the FCO might like an opportunity to get alongside of the Iraqis. I thanked him for the thought.



P R H Wright

Middle East Department

5 July 1972

Copies to: NENAD

News Department

Oil Department

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(*Adams will
NENAD
visa Dept*)

CLAIR

FM BAGHDAD 170900Z

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TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO VISA 107 OF 17 JUNE
INFO ROUTINE PARIS AND ROME.

THIS MORNINGS PRESS ANNOUNCES THE DEPARTURE ON 17 JUNE FOR ITALY, FRANCE AND ENGLAND OF A 4 MAN DELEGATION COMPRISING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BAATH PARTY (ABSP) THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY(KDP) AND THE IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY (ICP).

2. THE PURPOSE OF THEIR JOURNEY, ACCORDING TO THE DELEGATIONS LEADER IS " TO CONDUCT CONTACTS WITH VANGUARD ORGANISATIONS AND PROGRESSIVE FORCES IN THOSE COUNTRIES AIMING AT CLARIFYING THE RCC DECISION IN NATIONALISING THE MONOPOLISTIC IPC " AND "DISCUSSING WAYS AND MEANS OF STRENGTHENING THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST-COLONIALIST FRONT".

3. THE DELEGATION CONSISTS OF

- A) DR ZAID HAIDER, MEMBER OF THE ABSP'S NATIONAL (IE PAN-ARAB LEADERSHIP) LEADER
- B) HASHEM AQRAWI, MEMBER OF KDP CENTRAL COMMITTEE
- C) NOURI ABDUL RAZZAQ, MEMBER OF ICP
- D) SULTAN AL SHAWI, NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED, BUT PRESUMABLY A BA-ATHI.

4. NONE OF THEM HAVE APPLIED FOR VISAS HERE.

LEWTY

PASSPORT CONTROL DISTRIBUTION

M & VD

M. E D

Mr Burton *10/17* *Ent 2 pc*

RECEPTION FOR IRAQIS AT THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

1. I minuted on 5 July about a suggestion that a member of this Department might be invited to attend a reception to be held by Mr Will Griffiths MP for a visiting delegation of Iraqi Ba'athists and Communists.
2. As agreed, a member of this Department did not attend the reception, but I had an account of it subsequently from Mr Hobson of British Petroleum who was present. The reception took the form of a meeting with Mr Will Griffiths and the delegates on the platform, and with Members of Parliament and others totalling about 30 in the audience. The only Member of Parliament recognisable to Mr Hobson who asked questions was Mr Douglas Dodds-Parker, but there were hostile questions from two Iraqi students who claimed that the speakers were not true representatives of Iraq.
3. I told Mr Hobson that I understood that the Morning Star had reported that the delegation had been invited to this country by the Communist Party of Great Britain, to which he said that he was not at all surprised in view of the highly political tone of their statements. He said that he understood that CAABU were in some way associated with the visit (and I confirmed that Mr Michael Adams had been in touch with me about it) but said that they were not in evidence at the reception itself.

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10 JUL 1972

NBR 3/548/1




P R H Wright

Middle East Department

10 July 1972

Copies to: IRD
Parliamentary Unit
Oil Department
NENAD



M. Craig

⑧

M. Craig
NED

MINISTER

Mr William Griffiths MP has asked for an appointment with you. He wishes to discuss Iraq and the restoration of diplomatic relations. I have, therefore, arranged for him to call on you in your room at the House on Thursday 27 July at 4.00 pm.

2. I am asking for a brief to be prepared and for a member of the Department to be present during this meeting.

R V Welborn

20 July 1972

cc: Mr Craig (NENAD)

*Enter & resubmit
with Mr Wright
minute on Mr Griffiths
tea part flagged
RB 21/7*

*Submission sent to
Mr Godden on 26/7*

RB 26/7

*Now see record at ⑩
p 82/8*

Bo 1 week / noted

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REGISTRY No. 35
28 JUL 1972
NBR 3/548/1

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Minister of State

Mr Goulding

ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS: MR GRIFFITHS' CALL ON MR GODBER ON 27 JULY

A. SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS.

1. The Iraqi Government severed diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom on 1 December 1971, following the Iranian occupation of the Gulf Islands, for which the Iraqi Government held us responsible. In the event the severance was "soft"; both countries retained Interests Sections in the respective capitals to deal with commercial, consular and cultural matters. The Iraqi Government so far appears content with this situation.

2. Although it is for them, as the Government which severed relations, to make the first move towards resumption, the Iraqi authorities have not yet done so. Indeed, recent public comments by Iraqi Ministers, summarised below, demonstrate their continued hostility.

3. Clearly it would be in our interests to be fully represented in Baghdad, both to keep ourselves informed of events in a country of political and, especially, commercial importance to us in the Arab world, and to enable us properly to act in protection of British interests in Iraq. But in the absence of any sign of a desire on the part of the Iraqi authorities for improved relations, there is no reason at present for us to take any initiative.

Esp. w. the
light of
Soviet
penetration

B. NATIONALISATION OF THE IRAQ PETROLEUM COMPANY.

4. The major event of direct significance to the United Kingdom since December has been the nationalisation of IPC's interests in the northern oil fields of Iraq. The nationalisation law, which was announced on 1 June 1972, was the culmination of a protracted dispute between IPC and the Iraqi Government,

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-2-

going back to 1961 when the Qassem régime deprived the company of 99.56 per cent of its concession areas without provision for compensation. The present situation is that IPC mediation proposals over the 1972 nationalisation appear to have been accepted by the Iraqis but no substantive negotiations have yet begun.

C. PUBLIC COMMENTS BY IRAQI MINISTERS.

FLAG A

5. During an official visit to France in mid-June, Saddam Hussein, Vice-President of the Revolutionary Command Council and the real power behind the régime, drew parallels between the "wounds" now being suffered by Iraq at the hands of Britain, West Germany and America, and the wounds inflicted on France by the Nazis.

FLAG B

6. In an interview with a correspondent of "The Times" on 12 July the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Mr Baki, was reported to have urged Britain to follow France's example over oil and over the Palestine question. He also said that we must bear full responsibility for Iran's occupation of the Gulf Islands, and spoke of other instances of "secret British policies in the economic and political fields". Mr Baki indicated that if we were to meet these requirements the Iraqis might be willing to resume relations. Mr Griffiths may point to this as a gesture to which we should have responded. But clearly the pre-conditions which Mr Baki seeks to impose are unacceptable; and there has so far been no real indication of a desire on the part of the Iraqis to normalise relations.

D. RECEPTION AT HOUSE OF COMMONS BY MR GRIFFITHS.

7. Towards the end of June a four man Iraqi delegation arrived in the UK headed by Dr Zaid Haider, a member of the

/Arab

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-3-

Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party's national leadership.

According to Dr Haider, the purpose of their visit was to "conduct contacts with vanguard organisations and progressive forces aiming at clarifying the RCC decision in nationalising the monopolistic IPC" and "discussing ways and means of strengthening the anti-imperialist-colonialist front". Mr Griffiths held a reception for the delegation at the House of Commons on 6 July. The Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding asked if the FCO wished to be represented. After consultation with Protocol & Conference Department and the Parliamentary Unit, the offer was declined; our attendance would not have been in accordance with our normal practice in the case of countries with whom we have no diplomatic relations. A short second-hand description of events at the reception is enclosed.

FLAG C

E. VISAS FOR IRAQIS.

8. Following the attempt on General Naif's life in London in February the Minister of State agreed that all Iraqi applications for visas should be referred to London. The resultant, albeit short, delays in the issue of visas have irritated the Iraqi authorities who have told our Interests Section that they may have to take reciprocal action.

F. MR WILLIAM GRIFFITHS MP

9. Mr Griffiths was at one time the chairman of the Anglo-Iraqi Parliamentary Group (the Group does not appear to have been formed again in the post-1970 Parliament). His activities have, however, previously given offence to the Iraqi authorities.

/He

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-4-

FLAG D He arrived, drunk, at Baghdad in 1964 at the head of a delegation determined to make a fuss about the denial of human rights in Iraq; and in 1971 the Iraqi Ambassador complained about Mr Griffiths writing and speaking against the present régime in Iraq. His interest in promoting a resumption of relations is therefore somewhat obscure.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'P R H Wright', with a large, sweeping horizontal stroke underneath.

P R H Wright

Middle East Department

26 July 1972

Copies to: Mr Daunt
 Mr Parsons
 Mr Day, Personnel Operations Department
 Mr Chalmers, Oil Department

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RECORD OF CONVERSATION AT HOUSE OF COMMONS AT 4.00 PM ON 27 JULY 197

Present: The Rt Hon Joseph Godber MP Mr W Griffiths MP
 Mr B Smith

1. Mr Griffiths outlined his long connections with Iraq and said that at the end of June he had sponsored a meeting in the House of Commons for an Iraqi delegation representing the various parties in Baghdad. He said that, when the leader of the delegation mentioned the Iraqi régime's wish to be on good terms with Western Europe, he himself had suggested that they take steps to resume relations with the United Kingdom.
2. Mr Griffiths said that when they were leaving London the party's interpreter had sent him a message to say that a number of people had said the Iraqi authorities should resume relations with HMG; the leader of the delegation had asked whether there was anything we could do in Britain to make this easier. This was the purpose of his call. He asked whether it would help if he were to put down a question for written reply before the recess.
3. Mr Godber said he thought it would probably be best not to put down a question since, in view of recent Iraqi public criticism of the United Kingdom, the nationalisation of the Iraq Petroleum Company, and the significance of the Iraqi/Soviet treaty, any reply would have to be in fairly harsh terms; this was unlikely to help towards a resumption. He thought it better therefore to move towards resumption by more discreet means. He had had another similar approach in the last day or two through another Arab Ambassador to whom he had said that if the Iraqis intended to try to improve their relations with HMG, the latter would not necessarily look askance at such an approach, but it was for the Iraqi authorities to show their good intentions. Mr Godber mentioned that Syria too now seemed to be considering a resumption of relations with us; if she did, this could give the Iraqi authorities a lead towards restoring relations without too much loss of face.

Copies to: Mr Goulding
 Mr Parsons
 Mr Wright (MED)
 Mr Kay (NENAD)
 Miss Beckett (POD)
 Mr Hunt (Oil Department)
 Chancery, Baghdad

RSB 31/7
pa

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HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON, SW1

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31 JUL 1972
NBR 3/548/1

Regy
Ranjan Me
Smy

Mr. Will Griffiths, M.P. invites you to meet a delegation from Iraq to discuss the nationalisation of the Iraq Petroleum Company and other questions involving the future relationship between Britain and Iraq.

The delegation consists of:

- | | | |
|-----------------------|---|---|
| Dr. Zaid Haidar | - | Foreign Affairs adviser to the President |
| Mr. Hashem Akrawi | - | Member of the Central Committee of the Kurdish National Party |
| Mr. Nuri Abdel Razzak | - | Member of the Central Committee of the Iraq Communist Party |
| Mr. Sultan Shawi | + | Member of the Regional Command of the Baath Party |

The meeting will be held at the House of Commons (Committee Room 9) on Thursday, July 6th at 5.30 p.m.

Dear Will,
I have to be in Coventry on Thursday. I am sorry about my poor performance as being a fellow feeling Iraqi.
I have a fellow feeling Iraqi.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF THE LEBANESE AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON THE
MINISTER OF STATE ON THURSDAY 17 JULY 1972

Present

The Rt.Hon. Joseph Godber MP
The Hon. D A Gore-Booth

H E Mr Nadim Dimechkie

1. *Sisk (584)*

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- 2 AUG 1972
N3 R 3/548

1. Mr Dimechkie said that he would like to discuss recent developments in three countries, Syria, Iraq and Egypt.

Syria

2. Mr Dimechkie said that the Lebanese Government found the present Syrian régime much more open than the previous one. The Syrians were trying to de-polarise their political and economic dogma and as a sign of this some of the old Syrian middle-class exiles in Beirut were going back to Syria to study investment possibilities.

3. Ever since he had taken over responsibility for Syrian interests in the United Kingdom Mr Dimechkie had been trying to persuade the Syrians that relations should be re-established. The Syrians had been very receptive at first but developments over the Gulf Islands and particularly Iraq's breach of relations with Britain, had prevented further progress. However, the Syrian Prime Minister, to whom he had spoken in hospital yesterday, had told him that he was convinced that it was time to resume the process which had been interrupted several months ago. Mr Khleifawi had already identified the three diplomats he would send to London to work in the Lebanese Embassy as a first step. The most senior of these would be a good

/Minister

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Minister/Counsellor. Mr Dimechkie said that Mr Khleifawi should be out of hospital in five or six days and would then stay on for a week or so to convalesce. He hoped to give a lunch for the Prime Minister to which he would invite a number of MPs and which he hoped Mr Godber would be able to attend. Mr Godber said that he would welcome this if it could be fitted into his programme. He would be happy to entertain or be entertained by Mr Khleifawi but in the absence of relations these would have to be discreet and unofficial occasions.

Iraq

4. Mr Dimechkie said that he had recently been in touch with a member of the National (which, as he explained, was really the Supra-National) Council of the Ba'ath Party. He had done his best to convince this man, a 30 year old Palestinian graduate of London University, that it would be to Iraq's advantage to resume relations with Britain, particularly in view of Britain's forthcoming entry into the European Common Market. He hoped that this member of the Ba'ath National Council might have some success putting this view across in Baghdad and meanwhile he (Mr Dimechkie) had been given a free hand to invite a number of MPs to Iraq. Mr Godber said that he could see no harm in a few MPs visiting Baghdad. But as far as HMG were concerned the Iraq Government had built up a great feeling of resentment here over the rupture of diplomatic relations, their activities in the Gulf, their treatment of IPC, and their signature of the treaty with the Soviet Union. He would need to see a practical indication of a changed

/attitude

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attitude before he would be prepared to move very far.

Egypt

5. Mr Dimechkie said that the expulsion of the Soviet experts was one of the most important developments in the Middle East over the last ten years and he hoped that Britain would not miss this opportunity to get back and play a constructive part in the Middle East which would be beneficial to both sides.

Mr Godber agreed about the importance of the development but said that there was no question of our replacing or seeking to replace the Russians as the main supplier of arms to Egypt. For one thing, we were not at all sure yet what the Egyptians wanted or that the Egyptians had evaluated what they had done: for another we did not intend to find ourselves in a confrontation with the United States. But this did not mean we were not going to respond to Egyptian requests. We already had good relations with the Egyptians: we were supplying them with arms and we were ready to expand this. Mr Dimechkie wondered whether it might not be better to pursue our contacts with the Egyptians on private channels as it might be awkward for the British Government to step in in too obvious a fashion. Mr Godber agreed that we must have the closest possible contact with the Egyptians. Our objective all along had been to strengthen our relations with Egypt. But we would be unable to assess this development fully until the Egyptians decided what they really wanted and to what extent they wished to remain dependent on the Russians.

Near East & North Africa Department

28 July 1972

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3.

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Copies to : Mr Le Quesne

Mr Parsons NENAD

MED

Defence Department

Miss Beckett POD

Chanceries at Beirut
Cairo
Tel Aviv
Amman
Washington
Moscow
Paris
UKMis New York
Baghdad

239 King's Road,
London SW 3,
Telephone: 352 9145.
10th September, 1972.

R. Hillen
- 17/9

Diplomatic relations between Iraq
and Her Majesty's Government

In connection with my informal but real scholarly and policy-oriented interest in relations with the states of the Middle East, I should be grateful to be reminded of the circumstances (including precise dates) under which diplomatic relations between this country and Iraq were broken off.

I should also be interested, as background for my private information or if you prefer as a matter of general knowledge, to learn what steps are being taken to bring about a restoration of diplomatic relations, and, if this seems still rather a distant or improbable eventuality, what H.M.G sees as the chief obstacles to such a restoration.

I trust my request is not inconvenient, and would appreciate the favour of an early reply.

Yours faithfully,

Nicholas A. Hyman

(Nicholas A. Hyman)

Information Section,
Arabian and Near Eastern Departments,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Downing Street,
London SW 1.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 12 SEP 1972 NBR 3/10/72
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See 14

DW
18/9

Legisty
Pse Carter, resubmit
with Hqs on brief by Mr. Burton
for the Golder for visit
of the Golder for visit
of the Golder for visit
12/9
Dear Sirs,
Refer to 12.
12.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

N A Hyman Esq
239 King's Road
LONDON SW3

Your reference

Our reference **NBR 3/548/1**

Date **19 September 1972**


DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND IRAQ

Thank you for your letter of 10 September. (13)

The Iraqi Government severed relations with Her Majesty's Government on 1 December 1971 following the Iranian landings on the Tunb Islands on 30 November 1971. At the time of writing there is no indication of a move towards a resumption of diplomatic relations. It is for the Iraqi authorities, who broke off diplomatic relations, to make such a move.

G S Burton
Middle East Department

ASH 27/9
JA



Mr Wright

RELATIONS WITH IRAQ

Flag A 1. In para 3 of his letter of 11 October the head of the British Interests Section in Baghdad has commented that, in the absence of full diplomatic relations, he does not see any disadvantage in the restrictions on political work imposed on his Section. His letter provides a useful opportunity to look again at the conditions under which the Interests Section is operating in Baghdad, to consider whether there is real disadvantage of us in not having a full range of diplomatic activity in Baghdad, and whether we are making use of such sources of information as are available to us. - NBR 25/6

2. BACKGROUND

Flag B
NEQ 3/548/1
(1971) 736

When the Iraqi Government severed relations last December (on the grounds of British "betrayal" over the Iranian occupation of the Gulf islands) it was decided that political reporting was not of prime importance, and that our main interests were the handling of IPC traffic and consular/commercial work. The pattern of our staff in Baghdad, and the limitations on the work of the respective Interests Sections agreed with the Iraqis in the text of the notes exchanged with them, reflect this. It was also decided that, in view of the precedent during the earlier break in relations, the Swedes should again be asked to be the protecting power, even though they tend to be rather "correct" in their attitude to the limitations set on political work in the Interests Section. In contrast, the German and American Interests Sections, under French and Belgian protection respectively, do not appear to suffer from any restriction on their political activities. Despite the reciprocity which was imposed on the Iraqi Interests Section in London, moreover, it is difficult to believe that Iraqi representatives here have stuck to the letter of the agreement as we have.

/3.

Flag C ⑨

3. We last considered the possibility of resuming relations with Iraq in July; at that time we concluded that it would be in our interests to be fully represented in Baghdad, both in order to keep ourselves informed on the internal situation and to enable us properly to act in defence of British interests in Iraq (on which, see the attached copy of the latest Country Assessment Sheet). In the absence of any sign that the Iraqis wished to resume relations, however, we concluded that there was no reason for HMG to take the initiative.

Flag D
NBR3/1983 ⑦

4. When Mr W Griffiths MP called on Mr Godber at the end of July, he said that he had been asked by the leader of an Iraqi delegation whether there was anything which could be done in Britain to ease the way towards a resumption of relations. Such an enquiry would presumably not have been made without at least the knowledge of the Iraqi authorities. In response the Minister of State said that we would not necessarily look askance at an approach from the Iraqi authorities, but that if they wanted better relations it was up to them to show their good intentions. It was possible that Syria might resume relations with us; if she did, this could give the Iraqis a lead towards restoring relations without too much loss of face. (Mr Kershaw took the opportunity at a lunch in Beirut recently to include some friendly references to Syria in his speech; we now await a Syrian response.)

PRESENT POSITION

5. Mr Godber's remarks were presumably relayed back to the Iraqi authorities, but we have not seen any subsequent indication that the Iraqis wish to resume relations. So far as the Gulf islands are concerned, Iraqi statements are as uncompromising as ever and the Iraqis may well find considerable difficulty in explaining a resumption of relations with us so long as the islands position remains unchanged (as it will). On the oil front IPC have not so far had any substantive discussions with the Iraqi authorities over the question of compensation, though M Duroc Danner has been invited to make proposals by 11 November. And we continue to spot members of the Iraqi Public Relations Bureau (the intelligence branch of the Iraqi Ba'ath) applying for visas for the UK.

6. It remains therefore to be considered whether it is in our own interests to take the first step. Iraq is important to us principally because of her oil. Access to this remains blocked whilst IPC are trying to reach agreement over compensation; in the longer term however, it is clearly in the interests both of the IPC and of HMG to reach some form of agreement which will allow the oil to flow. Iraq is also of interest to us politically, both because of the wide and expanding penetration by the Soviet Union, and because of Iraq's potential for mischief-making in neighbouring Arab states, and particularly the Gulf, where we wish to see stability maintained. We need, therefore, to be as well informed as possible of Soviet activities and of the standing and policies of the leaders of the Iraqi régime.

7. On the oil question, our policy has so far been to leave it to IPC to make their own running in seeking a settlement with the Iraqis, though we continue to provide a safe and rapid channel of communications for the oil companies; this facility has not so far been affected by our reduced representation in Baghdad. We do however lack detailed information (see para 11 below) on the extent to which restrictions on oil sales are affecting the Iraqis, and hence the economic pressure there may be on them to reach a settlement.

8. On the question of the extent of Soviet penetration of Iraq our lack of detailed local information has been marked. When the Russians were expelled from Egypt in July, there was much speculation as to whether they would turn to Iraq (and Syria) to make up for what they had lost in Egypt. In the absence of reliable information we were unable to make any firm assessment, and we are still not in a position to do so.

9. There are three other fields of importance in any assessment of the internal situation in Iraq. The first, as always, is the question of relations between the Kurds and the central government, on which we do see a considerable amount of information from which it is clear that there is, as usual, unlikely to be any rapprochement between the two sides. We have also seen evidence that the Russians continue to try to bring the two sides together, though the Kurdish leader, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, has made plain that he will not move towards any national front until the RCC meet his demands.

we still
get some
from
Barzani
if possible.

10. The other two fields of interest to us are the state of the national economy and the positions of the two leaders, President Bakr and Saddam Hussein.

11. It is evident from a number of sources that the economic situation has deteriorated sharply and that some quarters in the Iraqi Government may be regretting the decision to nationalise IPC in June. There has been a virtual ban on travel abroad during the summer (a measure which alone must have severely affected Saddam Hussein's popularity); government salaries have been cut; missions abroad have been reduced; and imports are being both limited and directed towards countries with whom barter trade agreements have been concluded.

12. There have now been sufficient reports from various sources for us to be able to say with reasonable confidence that Saddam Hussein's personal position, though not weak, is at least no longer one of unquestioned superiority over President Bakr. Saddam Hussein's earlier predominance appears, indeed, to have rebounded, since he now seems to be the personal target for criticism over the stringent economic conditions consequent upon the nationalisation of IPC. This does not necessarily imply, however, that his position has weakened to the extent that his overthrow is imminent.

13. I have sketched in the broad picture above, with apologies for the length, to indicate that we are by no means lacking in general information on most aspects of the Iraqi scene. There are some major gaps (eg the extent of Russian activity) though it is fair to say that in Iraq (as in Egypt in 1968) a full diplomatic mission would not necessarily be in any better position to acquire information on Soviet activities. Nevertheless, such information as we acquire suffers from the lack of informed local diplomatic comment.

RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS

14. It is unlikely in present circumstances that, whatever the level of our representation in Baghdad, we should have much effect on the policies of the present régime. The political value of our Mission would, therefore, rest largely on the additional information which it was able to obtain. There are limitations on the gathering of political information which are broadly three-fold:

/i)

- i) restrictions on travel, particularly to the areas of most interest eg the Kurdish North and military areas;
- ii) given that we are in bad odour with the Iraqi authorities, local non-government sources are bound to be reluctant to be seen talking freely with our representatives;
- iii) the Iraqi authorities, if they were to agree to exchange Ambassadors, would presumably make it clear that we were in Baghdad on sufferance, would tend to keep us at arm's length, and would make clear that any overstepping of their line could result in relations again being broken off.

In these circumstances it is not at all certain that the restoration of full diplomatic representation would result in a marked improvement in our local knowledge. It is questionable whether the (at first sight) limited advantage would offset the disadvantage of putting ourselves in the position of demandeurs. There is also the possibility that an approach by us would lead to an Iraqi counter-demand for some unacceptable concession by ourselves (eg a public statement) over the islands. We should in any case need to ensure that any approach was carefully explained to the Iranians, to avoid misunderstanding.

OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION

15. There remain to be considered the other sources of information available to us. These are, broadly, in three categories:

a) Iraqi Visitors to the UK

Comments on the Iraqi scene from these visitors are obtained from time to time and are of value, although much of what they say must inevitably be viewed with a good deal of suspicion. These visitors comprise:

- i) opponents of the present régime living outside Iraq, many of whom would naturally wish to present as black a picture as possible;
- ii) visitors from Baghdad who, particularly since the imposition this year of severe restrictions on travel, must stand in well with the régime to be allowed to come, and can therefore generally be expected to toe the party line;

/iii)

iii) students, including military students, who again will presumably not wish to jeopardise their chances by speaking against their controllers of funds in Baghdad.

b) Oil Company Officials

The oil companies, quite reasonably, are careful not to become too identified with government; we cannot, therefore, expect them to report to us as a matter of course on the local scene. There does however seem value in encouraging more frequent political discussions with members of their senior staff who visit Iraq (Mr Milne is a good example).

c) Commercial Visitors to Iraq

There would be little point in talking to any but the more senior businessmen, particularly those in eg consultancy firms, who might be expected to take a somewhat wider interest than their own immediate commercial concerns. In the current austerity climate, and with a tendency to turn towards countries willing to do barter deals, the number of such sources of information is inevitably more limited; but they do still exist.

16. There are other secret sources of information not touched upon in the foregoing; much of the information they provide is extremely useful, though its value suffers from the lack of informed local diplomatic comment.

17. I have generally concentrated in the foregoing on the political activities of our representatives in Iraq, and on the lack of political information from which we suffer. Our commercial interests, such as they are at present, are adequately catered for by the three commercial members of the Interests Section; and between the consular staff on the spot and our own activities via the Afghans here, we can generally cope adequately with visa and consular matters.

CONCLUSIONS

18. Our Interests Section is at a disadvantage compared with the Germans and Americans because of the conditions accepted last

/December;

December; we are ~~however~~, unlikely to be able to change these conditions. The French have offered to supply us with information, however, and the recent establishment of a small American Interests Section should also provide us with some additional local assessment.

19. The Iraqis have given no sign that they would be ready to exchange Ambassadors. The advantages to us of a resumption seem marginal in the present state of relations, and do not appear to justify the risk, if we were to make the first move, either of a rebuff or of damaging our relations with Iran. If, however, progress is made in resuming relations with Syria, we should reconsider the question again.

20. In the meantime there would be advantage in taking more opportunities to have a talk on the political situation with returning senior businessmen and the occasional oil executive. If you agree I will make arrangements with the DTI for us to be informed of the visits of senior businessmen to Iraq. We can then consider in each case whether to get in touch with them on return; there would, of course, be no suggestion of asking them before they went to keep their eyes open on our behalf.

21. There would equally be advantage in an occasional political discussion with oil company executives. Mr Wright (or Mr Parsons, who may know him from Bahrain) might for example like to have a talk with Mr Milne over lunch.

22. Finally, I note that Mr McCluney has commented on the lack of employment for his commercial staff. We have some information on the economic situation in Baghdad but not enough. It would be of value to the DTI, to us, and no doubt to Oil Department to have as careful an assessment as the available information will allow of the present situation. It seems not unreasonable to ask the commercial staff in Baghdad to attempt this.


B Smith.
Middle East Department

9 November 1972

REVIEWERS SLIP
RESTRICTED WHEN COMPLETED

SS SIS MOD JIC

GCHQ LRT Officer

Head Historians

Class/ref..... FLC 8

Piece no..... 1901

Ref/folio..... (15)

Sensitivity of the material is

PERSONAL

INTERNATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE RELATED

OTHER (SPECIFY)

RHD Reviewers Recommendations

~~Release or~~

Block

A) in § 2, 114-5: "the handling...
traffic and..."

B) in § 7, 113-5: "...the ... continuation...
Baghdad."

Branch of Vienna Conv - by KMO

Name... M. L. Date... 25/04/02

Other Reviewers Recommendations

Release or

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Initials.....Date.....

Instructions for HP

See P/Nat Memo 20/5/02

Release or see Action Sheet

Name... [Signature] ... Date... 19/06/09

LRT Officer

RESTRICTED WHEN COMPLETED

Mr Parsons

Mr. Smith
Let us consider and skip. Minister of State
Riddle East Sept.
14/11
CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 35

22 NOV 1972

NR 3/548/1

RELATIONS WITH IRAQ

1. I attach a useful minute which Mr Smith of my Department has prepared at my request on the current state of our relations with Iraq and on the possibility of taking some initiative to improve these relations or, failing that, to improve the state of our knowledge about developments in Iraq.
2. I think that in retrospect the decision to choose the Swedes as our protectors at the time of the break in diplomatic relations last December was unwise, even though it was taken on the reasonable grounds that the Swedes had done an excellent job in protecting us on the previous occasion and on the grounds that the rump mission was unlikely to be required to do much political reporting.
3. The conclusions which I draw from Mr Smith's paper are as follows:
 - (i) That we cannot at this stage seek alternative protection to the Swedes, and that we are unlikely to be able to change the rules under which we operate in Baghdad.
 - (ii) That in the present circumstances we are unlikely to be able to raise the level of our representation in Baghdad (which would need in any case to be reciprocal with the Iraqis), although the Commercial Section there should be encouraged to do more economic reporting.
 - (iii) That there are serious disadvantages in the idea of taking any initiative ourselves towards resuming relations with the Iraqis, at least until IPC have reached some agreement. Any approach would need to be explained carefully to the Iranians and might well come to grief if the Iraqis were to require from us unacceptable statements on the islands

/(since

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
CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

(since this was the pretext for the break). For the moment the best we can perhaps hope for is that any resumption of relations with Syria will encourage the Iraqis to follow suit.

(iv) That we should consider ways of improving our intelligence on developments in Iraq. I propose to take up an offer made to me last month by M Rouillon of the Quai d'Orsay to share with us French information and Mr Chalmers, with whom I have discussed this question, has suggested that the Dutch Embassy in London might also be helpful. I would also like to pursue further Mr Smith's suggestion of discussions with Mr Milne (his paragraph 21) although any attempt to acquire information on Iraqi politics from oil or other business personalities will have to be made carefully.

4. Since Mr Smith's paper provides a convenient perspective on our current relations with Iraq, you may wish to pass these papers to Lord Balniel's Private Secretary for the Minister of State's information.



P R H Wright

Middle East Department

9 November 1972

Copies to: Mr Chalmers
Mr Ritchie
Mr Pike

Mr Daur.

Mr LeQuene

CONFIDENTIAL

/I hope....

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 22 NOV 1972 NBR 3/548/1
--

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Coles

I hope that the Minister of State will have time to read Mr. Smith's paper which gives a very good general picture of the state of play in Anglo/Iraqi relations. It is important that we should continue to keep this question under review and we shall certainly take the steps set out by Mr. Wright to improve our flow of information on Iraq. But we should not in any way run after the Iraqis for a resumption of relations. The trouble is that they have got themselves on to the hook of the Gulf Islands and it is hard to see how they can get off it. But this is their problem. If they thought that we were running after them, they would unquestionably want us to make some unacceptable statement about the Islands and we should only end up worse off than we are now - having refused to do what they would wish us to do.

2. Meanwhile, at practical level, life goes on. There are still more Iraqis in Britain than any other Arabs and our export trade to Iraq is still very healthy. I was told recently that British consulting engineers are at present engaged in projects worth up to £150 million sterling in Iraq.


A D Parsons

10 November 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

R W Renwick Esq
British Embassy
Paris

Your reference

Our reference

Date 10 November 1972

25/11/72
JS

IRAQ

1. During the Anglo-French talks on the Middle East on 25 October I explained to M Rouillon of the Quai d'Orsay that we maintain only a small Interests Section in Baghdad and that, because of the restrictions on the political activities of the Section, we receive very little information on the political situation in Iraq. M Rouillon was very forthcoming and said that the Quai would be happy to share with us their information on Iraq. He suggested that this should be done through you in Paris.

2. I should be grateful if you would follow this up with Rouillon to see what he can produce. In preparation for this you may find useful the enclosed copies of:

.....
.....
(i) extracts from our Country Assessment Sheet on Iraq;

(ii) a minute recently prepared by Brian Smith in this Department on the sources of information available to us about the country, which gives some background to events there.

3. Leaving aside oil, on which we already receive briefing, our main interests in Iraq are the extent of Soviet penetration, the economic situation, the situation in the north and the fortunes of the leading members of the Revolutionary Command Council. You may find useful the following check list:

a. Soviet Penetration

- (i) number of Russians (civil and military) in Iraq, and any indication that the number is increasing;
- (ii) any evidence of Soviet influence over RCC decisions;
- (iii) any indication of military bases being provided for the Russians.

/b.

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-2-

b. Economic Situation

- (i) the current state of the economy following the nationalisation of the IPC;
- (ii) possible foreign exchange crisis.

c. The North

- (i) current state of Ba'ath/Kurd relations, including possibility of renewed conflict;
- (ii) Kurdish/Soviet relations.

d. Revolutionary Command Council

- (i) stability of present régime;
- (ii) changes in the relative strengths of Saddam Hussain Al Tikriti (Deputy Chairman of the RCC) and President Bakr.

4. I should add that there is some current parliamentary interest here in the fate of Iraq's Jews. If the French can provide any information on the question, we should be interested to see it, but would not of course make use of it in replies to PQs unless they agreed.

P R H Wright

Middle East Department

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

R/ 'AL SWEDISH EMBASSY
British Interests Section
BAGHDAD

*Perhaps we are often all being too
harsh on the Swedes - but the
NH in Stockholm have expressed
very. hesitations about any
political work on our behalf
in b'ad.*

*Mr. Smith
Mr. Hunt
Mr. Wright
Enter*

18A 16

17/11

G S Burton Esq
Middle East Department
F C O

Your reference

Our reference 25/1

Date 14 November 1972

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 35
20 NOV 1972
31548/1
NBR. 548

Dear Graham,

SWEDISH AMBASSADOR


1. Before coming to Baghdad I remember we discussed the problem of dealing with the Swedish Ambassador Gunnar Gerring. I believe he had in the past watched closely the activities of the British Interests Section.
2. I think you should know that since I arrived I have found the Ambassador extremely cooperative. Not only does he leave the Interests Section to carry on with its commercial, consular and cultural activities showing only the minimum of polite interest but he is also more than willing to help out if we find ourselves in difficulty over some consular matter or the like. In a recent case of a Canadian citizen in jail he was prepared at one stage to call on the Chief of Protocol on a Sunday morning, a day in which the Swedish Embassy is closed.
3. Mr Gerring has also taken in recent weeks a certain interest in the British community. Following the initial welcome/farewell party for Ian Lewty and myself to which a large number of the community were invited, his wife gave a coffee party for as many British wives as she could muster. The Ambassador also very kindly asked whether we would like to nominate guests for the Swedish National Day and invited about 50 members of the British community together with 70 or so Iraqis. Unfortunately the Iraqi guests did not attend the Reception. But it was a very kind gesture on the part of the Ambassador.
4. I have of course taken every opportunity to thank Mr Gerring and his wife for their kindness towards the community and our own staff here but I think it would be appropriate if the same sentiments were expressed informally in Stockholm. I am sending a copy of this letter to Miss Hutchinson.

*Yours ever,
la*

I McCluney

c.c. Miss P M Hutchinson
STOCKHOLM

RESTRICTED



ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY

British Interests Section
BAGHDAD

Your reference

G S Burton Esq
Middle East Department
F C O

Our reference

25/1

Date

16 November 1972

*Reply sent
18B 1/12
for*

Dear Graham,

POLITICAL REPORTING

1. As you will know the terms of our agreement with the Swedes precludes political reporting from Baghdad. At the same time there are two areas of my activity here on which I would welcome your views.

2. Firstly the interest shown by the British press in the current dispute between the Kurdish Democratic Party and Ba'ath Socialist Party here must make you long for some hard information about what is going on in Baghdad. There has also been in the last few days an Oil Symposium on the use of oil as a political weapon (my telno 440 refers).

3. In order to be of some help to you in this situation I discussed today informally with the Swedish Ambassador the possibility of sending an occasional summary of the Baghdad press. His reaction was not unfavourable but he asked for time to think the matter over. In the meantime he confirmed that it was quite acceptable for me to send you selected newspaper cuttings and translations verbatim, and this I will do. Naturally I will only report the major issues.

4. Secondly the Dutch Second Secretary has invited me to join a meeting of a group of EEC country "number twos" to discuss political affairs in Baghdad on a regular monthly basis. (It may be extended to a NATO group in order to include the Americans, and thus the Turk and the Greek). These meetings follow the path of a similar commercial group which has existed for some years, (and which we attend).

5. I have also mentioned this informally to the Swedish Ambassador, and again his reaction was not unfavourable. He commented that there was nothing to prevent me talking to these people in the normal course of diplomatic parties and calls; if there was a slight danger it lay in the fact that the Iraqis might be sensitive to my being known to attend meetings of this kind. I told him that I had initially indicated to the Dutch Second Secretary that to attend these meetings would be incompatible with our apolitical rôle, but the Ambassador said he would still like to think the matter over.

.../6.

ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY

British Interests Section

BAGHDAD

Your reference

Our reference

Date

6. I have no doubt that the Ambassador will consult Stockholm on these two matters even though ours was an informal discussion, and you may in turn may hear of this. I cannot believe that it is right for me to isolate you entirely from public news and our diplomatic colleagues in Baghdad, but I would be grateful for your advice.

* 7. Please add paragraph in my telno 444 of 18 November. — (17)

Yours ever,

Ian

I McCluney

* As I am sure you are aware, the Swede has no actual control over what we report from Baghdad. He does not examine our files or see our telegrams. It is thus very much a gentlemen's agreement.

CONFIDENTIAL

NBL 3/502/1

19



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

I McCluney Esq
British Interests Section
Baghdad

Your reference

Our reference

Date 21 November 1972

IRAQ

1. Following receipt of your round-up letter of 11 October we have been taking another look at our relations with Iraq, and at our sources of information on the country. Copies of internal minuting on the subject have been sent to de Courcy Ireland in Kuwait and will be available for you on your next visit there.

2. One aspect on which your Commercial Officers could perhaps help is in remedying our lack of detailed up-to-date information on the economic situation in Iraq. I do not, of course, suggest that they should stray outside the limitations imposed on the activities of your Section; but a careful local assessment prepared within those limits would help us in forming an opinion of the economic constraints imposed on the Iraqi Government in the post-nationalisation period. If you see no objection perhaps you would ask your Commercial Officers to see what they can produce.

P R H Wright

Middle East Department

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NOR 3/548/1

(2)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

P G de Courcy Ireland Esq
British Embassy
Kuwait

Your reference

Our reference

Date 21 November 1972

ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS

.... 1. You may be interested in the attached copies of minutes which set out our latest thinking on Anglo-Iraqi relations, and which have been seen by Lord Balniel.

2. I should be grateful if you would ensure that the minutes are seen by Ian McCluney when he next visits Kuwait.

P R H Wright

Middle East Department

25/11/72
ja

CONFIDENTIAL

NBR 3/548/1

(21)

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

J Ashwood Esq
CRE 4
Department of Trade and Industry
Victoria Street
LONDON SW1

Your reference

Our reference

Date 22 November 1972

Dear Sir,

IRAQ

1. In the absence of diplomatic relations with Iraq we lack our usual sources of informed local comment on what is happening there. One source to which we might turn to fill in some of the gaps is the more important and perceptive business visitor who is willing to share with us his impressions. Clearly there would be no point in talking to the run-of-the-mill visitor concerned only with his own business; but the bigger fish, particularly those in the contracting or consulting fields, would be expected to take an interest in matters outside their own immediate sphere and could be useful. There would, of course, be no question of our asking them in advance to keep their eyes open on our behalf.

2. If you think the idea is a starter would it be possible for you to let me know when the occasional suitable visitor turns up? We can then consider whether to ask him to come and talk to us. I hope you will not find this an imposition.

Yours sincerely,

Brian

Brian Smith
Middle East Department

su (13)

pub

23/11

BU 1/10/73
23/11/72
BU 8.1.73

CONFIDENTIAL

NBR 3/548/1 (22)
(1972)

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to NBR 5/1 (7) and

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
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DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
1 VICTORIA STREET

LONDON SW1H 0ET

01 222 7877



28 November 1972

B Smith Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Dear Brian
IRAQ

- (2) — Thank you for your letter of 22 November about visitors to Iraq. I have noted the valid points made and although we may not have much to offer in the bracket you suggest I will certainly bear in mind re future nominees.

Yours ever
J Ashwood
J ASHWOOD

PS. I had one good candidate about 3 weeks ago - March of Parsons Power Gas but he's returned to Iraq.

A copy of my file note of talk with him will reach you shortly.

Good.
Mr. Butler
has seen
p/b 29/41

IN CONFIDENCE

27

RECEIVED IN
GISTRY No. 35
29 NOV 1972

BRITISH EMBASSY
BRUSSELS

98/3

21 November 1972

Major P V Cowley (ret'd)
Ministry of Defence
Metropole Buildings
Northumberland Avenue
London WC2

NBR 3/548/1

Mr. [unclear] 28/11
Mr. [unclear] (Dep) 28/11
A faint echo of the
dispute earlier this year. I fully
agree with Mr. MacRae that Brussels
Embassy should not be used
as a postbox.

CORRESPONDENCE FOR THE IRAQ MILITARY ATTACHE

1. I thought I ought to tell you that I have passed on your letter (D/55/4/FLS(A)) of 14 November to Colonel Al Zuhair by post. (The correct address, incidentally, is Boulevard August Reyers 155, 1040 Brussels.) As you know, we do not have relations with the Iraq Government at present; so we are not in the habit of sending our messengers to the Iraq Embassy.

2. I would have thought it would really be easier if you sent correspondence of this sort to the British Interests Section of the Royal Swedish Embassy in Baghdad to pass on there - assuming that you find the Afghans, who I believe are still looking after Iraq interests in London, too ineffective. (I would not dare to trespass on your pastures were it not for the fact that I was kicked out of Baghdad myself in December and therefore have a certain working knowledge of the situation.)

A C D S MacRae

Blind copy to:

B Smith Esq
Middle East Department
PCO

IN CONFIDENCE

I have another one - short tel.

(25)

1/12

No oil objection, I take it?

573/E 67/30
TEL NR 955/30

RR FCO

RR KUWAIT

OR 40

Mr. Wright

Mr. Smith

TOP
ADVANCE COPY

1. I think not. M.
2. Mr. McLurey does not need permission to visit K. and the tel. does not, therefore, call for a reply.

1st ME
1st PDI

[FILES]

Xerox 1.

4m. 29/XI.

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 301000Z NOVEMBER

RESTRICTED

TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 452 OF 30 NOVEMBER

INFO KUWAIT.

UNLESS YOU SEE OBJECTION I PROPOSE TO VISIT KUWAIT 9-12 DECEMBER TO READ THE MINUTES MENTIONED IN WRIGHT'S LETTER OF 21 NOVEMBER. DONOVAN WILL BE IN CHARGE IN MY ABSENCE.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 -1 DEC 1972 NBR 31548/1
--

MCCLUREY

NNNN

2505/12
pa

NBR 3/548/1

26

I
RR BAGHDAD

RR KUWAIT

GPS 35

EN CLAIR

FM F C O 011135Z

NO DISTRIBUTION

UNCLASSIFIED.

TO ROUTINE BAGHDAD TELNO.310 OF 1 DECEMBER INFO KUWAIT.

25- YOUR TELNO.452.

1. NO OBJECTION.


DOUGLAS-HOME

NNNN

455/1.2
pa

CONFIDENTIAL

(27) (2)



BRITISH EMBASSY
KUWAIT

3/20

29 November 1972

P R H Wright Esq
MED
FCO

I shall like to see the min. for. let us read
by the McCluney visit of 9 Dec.

Mr. H. Wright Esq

Mr. Smith

Mr. Bush

Dear Patrick

ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS

1. Thank you very much for the interesting series of minutes about your latest thinking on Anglo/Iraqi relations, enclosed in your letter of 21 November. We shall certainly ensure that Ian McCluney sees them when he next visits - this may be fairly soon, as when he was here last month he was talking of paying a family visit here before Christmas. In the meantime, perhaps we may be allowed to stray somewhat outside our parish.

2. There was not much time during Ian McCluney's visit, which was very much a flying one, to discuss business, but we did talk briefly about the problems of political reporting. He told me that the Swedish Ambassador left him very much to his own devices and that on the basis of his experience so far, it seemed it would be perfectly possible for him to conduct political correspondence etc without the Swedes being aware of what was happening.

3. Though there is no reference to this in Smith's minute, I assume that you have at some stage considered the possibility of the British Interests Section engaging in political activity behind the backs of the Swedes, and have discarded it. I wonder, however, whether it might not be worth reconsidering the position in the light of what McCluney has said. There are, of course, two to some extent distinct aspects to this: active pursuit of information for the purpose of producing political reports (eg cultivation of such official and private contacts as the regime's security system will allow) and the actual compilation and despatching of the reports which can, at its lowest level, involve no more than "kremlinological" culling of the local press. The first is probably the more likely to draw itself to the attention of the protecting power, though if done discreetly it can be very difficult to pin-point and take exception to (unless of course the Iraqis complained). The second need never come to light, if the protecting power does not in practice seek to check the files (suitable arrangements could presumably be made if necessary for the handling of "political" papers).

/4...

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4. If it were felt that we should not take the risk of offending the Swedes by too open a breach of the conditions they have laid down, I wonder whether it would be practicable to reach agreement with the French and Germans for the preparation of jointly agreed reports on political developments in Iraq, in the spirit of the Davignon consultations. Again, if we wished to step over the line laid by the Swedes, either they, or the Belgians and Americans, might be willing to agree to the transmission of reports of our own which we would not wish to be found passing through our own bags.

5. Quite apart from the above, it would always be possible to arrange for McCluney or some other member of his staff to come down here on the pretext of a bag run or shopping spree to report on developments, both regularly and in an emergency.

6. If you think that any of the above is worth discussing with McCluney, please let us know and we can arrange a convenient time for him to pay another visit. My apologies if I am starting a hare unnecessarily.

Yours ever

Paddy

P G de Courcy-Ireland

CONFIDENTIAL

NBR 25/6
3/248/1

27A

RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

I McCluney Esq
British Interests Section
Royal Swedish Embassy
BAGHDAD

Your reference

Our reference

Date 30 November 1972

18/7/12
pc

POLITICAL REPORTING

18A

16

1. Thank you for your letter of 16 November. It was pleasant to learn from both the letter under reference and your earlier letter of 14 November of the spirit of cooperation which exists between you and our Swedish "protectors".

2. I agree that the Swedish Ambassador is probably referring to Stockholm the two suggestions you discussed with him recently and you should not take any further action pending the receipt of any instructions which may be sent to him. In the meantime, you may care to have our preliminary reactions.

3. I assume that the suggestion in your para 3 is for an occasional commentary on local press coverage of internal matters, and not merely a summary (which we would regard as totally innocuous and so not requiring prior agreement from the Swedes). We agree that such comment need not come to the notice of the Iraqis and ought not to stretch Swedish cooperation too far. We therefore favour this proposal, and would favour its extension to include comments picked up from your diplomatic colleagues though we should not wish you to expose yourself to Iraqi criticism by too eagerly seeking out such comment.

4. Whereas the Iraqis would have no reason to know you were sending us the commentaries suggested in para 3 above, we must assume that they would quickly become aware of your attendance at the EEC group meetings. While it is difficult to believe that the Iraqi Interests Section in London has stuck to the letter of the agreement on Interests Sections' activities, as we have, the Iraqi Government might decide to make some show of righteous indignation at your openly indulging in political work, including perhaps a formal protest through the Swedish Embassy. This might have unfortunate repercussions on our relations with the Swedes.

15.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED



- 2 -

5. In sum we should, of course, be only too glad to receive the suggested commentaries, and we await Ambassador Gerring's further thoughts with interest. We are, however, somewhat less happy at the prospect of your taking part in formal political meetings, though we shall reserve final judgement on this until you report the Swedish reaction.

6. I am copying this letter and yours to Patricia Hutchinson in Stockholm.

G S Burton
Middle East Department

Copy to : Miss P M Hutchinson - STOCKHOLM +
ENC

RESTRICTED

28

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 - 5 DEC 1972 NBR 3/578/1

RR KUWAIT

GPS 25

EN CLAIR

FM FCO 011650Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO ROUTINE KUWAIT TELNO 723 OF 1 DECEMBER.

DE COURCY-IRELAND'S LETTER 3/20 OF 29 NOVEMBER.

REPLY FOLLOWS IN TUESDAY'S BAG.

DOUGLAS-HOME

NNNN

sl 12
12

RESTRICTED

284

ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY

British Interests Section

BAGHDAD

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 - 6 DEC 1972 NBR 25/6 3/5218/1
--

Your reference

G S Burton Esq
Middle East Department
F C O

Our reference

25/1

Date

2 December 1972

Dear Graham,

POLITICAL REPORTING

(19) - 1. My letter 25/1 of 16 November 1972 has been rather overtaken
NBR 3/548/1 - by Patrick Wright's letter of 21 November. I look forward to
(19) reading the minutes you have sent to Kuwait. However the Ambassador
has now told me that he would be perfectly happy for me to send you
unclassified summaries from the Baghdad press from time to time.

2. In paragraph 4, as regards joining the EEC political group
meetings in Baghdad, Mr Gerring has pointed out that Sweden is
not a member of either the EEC or NATO and it would not be
appropriate for a member of his staff to attend such meetings.
This seems a logical solution and it may well be that very little
is passed at the meetings which I do not hear in my normal social
contact with the members of the group.

Yours ever

la

I McCluney

*All coming from
has been copied to
Mr Smith
Mr Hunt
Mr Wright
Mr Gerring
19-12-72 to report
events outside to
Stockholm*

*This is rather odd. It seems
Mr McCluney wanted only
a to report unclassified summaries
of the press and
to attend, but not to report
on the EEC meetings*

RESTRICTED

RR KUWAIT

OR 20

ENCLAIR

FM F C O 051320Z

UNCLASSIFIED
TO ROUTINE KUWAIT TELNO 324 OF 5 DECEMBER.

(25) MY TELNO. 323.

1. REPLY NOW IN CONFIDENTIAL BAG ARRIVING 9 DECEMBER.

DOUGLAS-HOME

NNNN

6/12
ja

Covering Confidential Reference

RECEIVED
-6 DEC 1972
NBR 3/548/1
(30)

Mr. Hunt

5/12

Mr. Wright

Flag A

(27)

ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS: MR DE COURCY-IRELAND'S LETTER OF 29 NOVEMBER. (27)

Flag B

(29)

1. I have sent a telegraphic reply to Kuwait promising a substantive reply by ~~Tuesday's~~ ~~Thursday's~~ non-confidential bag (December 7).

Flags C & D

NBR 25/6 (19)

Flag E

NEQ 3/548/1 (159)

2. I attach copies of Mr McCluney's letter of 16 November and my reply, together with a copy of FCO tel no 152 of 20 December 1971 to Abu Dhabi.

3. I submit a draft reply.

now rec (31)



G S Burton
Middle East Department

4 December 1972

letter to issue.

Ph
7/12
NBR 7/12
ga

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

P G de Courcy Ireland Esq
British Embassy
Kuwait

Your reference

Our reference

Date 6 December 1972

*usb 7/12
ja*

ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS

1. Thank you for your interesting letter of 29 November — (27) about the future activities of our Interests Section in Baghdad.

....
2. Coincidentally Ian Mc Cluney wrote to us on the same theme recently, and I enclose for your information a copy both of his letter and of our reply. Basically you are right to assume that our major concern is not to offend the Swedes or to cause them any embarrassment in Iraq. The terms of our agreement with the Swedish Government are clear and were set out in FCO telegram no 152 of 20 December 1971 to Abu Dhabi, a copy of which I enclose for ease of reference. In sum, HMG have undertaken not to indulge in any form of political reporting, and we would not wish to step too far out of line without Swedish consent.
....

3. With regard to the proposal in your paragraph 4 for cooperation with other governments, you may be interested to note that we have recently taken up an offer by the Quai d'Orsay to share with us French information on Iraqi affairs. We do not at present think it necessary to take this cooperation further to the point of formally preparing joint reports on the situation in Iraq, since under the present arrangement we can obtain the information without the need to clear our action with the Swedes.

4. We now await Swedish reactions to the suggestions in McCluney's letter. The Swedes are unlikely to object to a little discreet comment on local press reports and on informal conversations with other diplomats; but they will probably not wish us to risk evoking a protest from the Iraqis by engaging in more formal activities such as the EEC get-together. If our guess is wrong on this we shall look at the matter again. I shall in any case be interested to see the report of your discussions with McCluney.

/5.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

5. I agree, of course, that in an emergency McCluney would be able to come down to Kuwait to report through you if for any reason he were not able to do so direct.

6. I am sending a copy of your letter and my reply to Patricia Hutchinson in Stockholm.

Johnson

Wright

P R H Wright

Middle East Department

P.S. Since dictating the above we have received a further letter from McCluney conveying the reactions of the Swedes; not surprisingly they do not wish us to go beyond the agreed conditions.

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32

ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY

Interests Section
BAGHDAD

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 3

18 DEC 1972

NBR 3/548/1

G S Burton Esq
Middle East Department
F C O

Your reference

Our reference 25/1

Date 13 December 1972

*File 18/12
Mr. Smith OR*

Dear Graham,

POLITICAL REPORTING

- (27A) 1. Thank you for your letter of 30 November. I will arrange to send you an occasional commentary on local press coverage and diplomatic gleanings on internal matters.
2. In a sense the difference between a summary and a commentary is not great when dealing with Baghdad. In summarising the press one inevitably makes some kind of commentary, in the selection of items if nothing else. I therefore hope to report to you the kind of published information on which this post would base its political reporting if it had a political capacity.

Yours ever

Can.


P.S. I have not yet seen the minutes in Kuwait.

I McCluney

c.c. Miss P M Hutchinson
STOCKHOLM

RESTRICTED

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33

British Embassy
Stockholm

11 December 1972

G S Burton Esq
Middle East Department
FCO

MSB 18/12
pa

BU 8/11/73
21/12

Dear Mr Burton

1. You will be mildly interested in the enclosed copy of a communication we received at the end of last week from the Iraq Embassy in Stockholm....

Yours truly

Peter Hutchinson

Enc

Miss P M Hutchinson

RESTRICTED

EMBASSY
OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
STOCKHOLM



! But we have no
relations!

14 ofl

December 3rd 1972

No. 285


See
9/12

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that having been appointed to another post, I shall be leaving Stockholm today. Pending the arrival of my successor, Mr. Abdul Karim Tikriti, Embassy Counsellor, will be in charge of the Embassy in the capacity of Chargé d'Affaires a. i.


I wish to take this opportunity to express my appreciation of the cordial ties, both official and personal, which have always existed between us and which have so happily reflected the friendship between our two countries and our two Missions.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.


A. W. Babajan

H. E. the Ambassador of Great Britain
Sir Guy Millard

STOCKHOLM



**BRITISH EMBASSY,
STOCKHOLM.**

21 December 1972

[Handwritten notes:]

RH
Mr. H...
Mr. Burton
Mt Burton
Lopes
have been sent
Richardson
Have these copies been sent?
Cpr Pod.
wed

As suggested by McCluney in his letter to Burton of 14 November, I took an opportunity on 13 December to thank Wachtmeister, Head of the Political Department of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, warmly for the help that Ambassador Gerring has given to the British Interests Section over consular matters, and for his kindness in including them and other members of the British community in social occasions.

2. Wachtmeister was gratified and said that he would record what I had said and pass it on to the right quarters.


3. I am copying this letter to McCluney in Baghdad.

Love over

Gay Millard

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35



BRITISH EMBASSY,
STOCKHOLM.

3/1

P R H Wright Esq
Middle East Department
FCO

21 December 1972

Enter.

Mr. ~~Butler~~ 11/1

Mr. Wright or.

29/12

fa

Handwritten initials: R 3/1

Dear Wright,
ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS

31 - 1. Thank you for sending us a copy of your letter of 6 December to de Courcy Ireland in Kuwait, in reply to his letter of 29 November.

27 - 2. I can understand that our Interests Section in Baghdad finds it frustrating not to be able to do some political reporting. However, in the light of the postscript to your letter, I am sure that we should abide strictly by the terms of our agreement with the Swedes. It would be extremely embarrassing if they found out or suspected that we were not doing so. As you say, McCluney can visit Kuwait if the need arises.

John Cox

Guy Millard

Copy to:
A J Wilton Esq CMG MC
H M Ambassador
Kuwait

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL



BRITISH EMBASSY
KUWAIT

17 December 1972

Enter
Mr. B. 1/1
Mr. Wright (or.)

29/12

P R H Wright Esq
Middle East Dept
FCO

Mr. Wright

Thank you. *Mr. Wright*
yes and I intended for. to expect a calendar
the past month for the Annual Report,
ago 1/1/1 I think?
Dear Patrick

POLITICAL REPORTING IN BAGHDAD

1. Whilst in Kuwait on 16 December I was able to read your submission of 9 November on relations with Iraq, — (16) together with your correspondence with Kuwait.
- (31) — 2. In your letter 3/20 of 6 December to de Courcy-Ireland you suggested that we could always get to Kuwait in an emergency to report. In fact this would not be so easy, as the exit visa formalities usually take a week or ten days, and to press urgently for a visa in "emergency circumstances" might be difficult and would certainly look suspicious to the Iraqis. If the need arises I would find it simpler to use our excellent DWS facilities - if necessary destroying all record of the telegrams at our end. However, visits to Kuwait will provide an opportunity, which I hope you will agree is no less useful, for me to piece together a letter or two on the main subjects of interest, which I take to be Anglo-Iraqi relations, internal political and economic affairs and Soviet bloc influence.
3. The commercial staff are preparing the report on the economy for which you asked and I hope to send this off on my return to Baghdad. My recent letters about the Baghdad press and resumption of diplomatic relations are really the sum of what I have to say on internal affairs and Anglo/Iraqi relations. On Soviet bloc influence I have one or two disjointed comments which I shall set out separately.

To this I would
add Iraqi
aspirations in
the Gulf.

Ref
29/12

Yours ever

Paddy
for Ian McCluney

CONFIDENTIAL

LAST PAPER

UK/Iraq Political Relations. Political Relations Between UK And Iraq`. 29 Mar. 1972. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 8/1901. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107471795/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=0bfa13db&pg=1. Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.